


BATTLE FOR HURUNGWE

A Special Branch victory in an unwinnable war
Rhodesia 1965-1979



John Padbury

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Chief Makoni (right) attending the Freedom of Makoni granted to the BSAP Support Unit by the rural council) 14/10/1978. He was expected to attend government functions but offered no protection at his residence. Photo from Blue and Gold and The Outpost, October 1978, p.12.



Lord Owen and the author, 18/3/2012.



Lynx, Osprey 337. Photo by Chris Tucker.



Propaganda meeting with Chief Makoni (beard) and his people. Note the sacred tree.



Alouette 111 helicopter deploying assault troops. Photo by Roy McCrea.



Phil Archenhold loads a cassette into a G-Car piloted by Terence Murphy. Photo by Phil Archenhold.



Alouette 111 with SAS troops dropping into Mozambique. Photo by Beaver Shaw.

7 ~ TRANSITION

Some or later a false half trophy up against reality.
George Orwell

The Path to the "Internal Settlement": A Case of Missed Opportunities

Virtually from the outset of UDF, Prime Minister Ian Smith was involved with negotiations with Brian, Robin Harvey comments, "CIO head Ken Flower, together with his Deputy Derek Robinson, maintained contact with British and international intelligence and diplomatic organisations. This communication was essential as it provided Ian Smith access to worldwide intelligence and trained diplomatic channels with both Britain and the African Nationalists. CIO and SR created one skilled, professional, covert and covert operations, reporting daily to Jack Goffland, the hard line right-wing Secretary to the Prime Minister and Cabinet. In highly sensitive operations, they were privy to intelligence from members of the Rhodesian hierarchy. This information was relayed to government placing the RP in a privileged position. Instead of utilising the information to manoeuvre a political solution Smith used it to remain a step ahead of Nkomo and out manoeuvre him. I believe Mawema was reluctant to join the Rhodesian Government as he was concerned he would merely be a "puppet" in white rule. This would isolate him from International and Nationalist support, weaken his "power base" and marginalise him as a leader. In time this was the case when he participated in the March 3rd 1978 agreement. Dr David Owen agreed, "My own judgement is that the Bishop was always necessary for an internal settlement but that he was not at ease in being presented as the leader when in his heart of hearts he realised that Smith was still in control." Joshua Nkomo would face the same dilemma which possible explains his reluctance to join the Rhodesian Government in 1978 during the secret David Owen initiative. In the course of time, it has become clear that Smith did not always hold the advice of his CIO's.

Numerous conferences and talks were held between Britain, America, South Africa, the Rhodesian Front, African nationalists, Front Line States, including Angola, Botswana, Mozambique and Zambia. Regular diplomatic shuttle, occurred between all parties, including the Organisation of African Unity and the Liberation Council of Tanzania (Julius Nyerere), Mozambique (Samora Machel) and Zambia (Kenneth Kaunda). Every effort was being made to end the Rhodesian political impasse and prevent the escalating war and endless casualties on both sides. Rhodesia had been thrust onto the world stage with the white-minority government at one end and a political settlement. With the political discrepancies and manoeuvring in progress, two facts began to emerge. Firstly, NIBMAR (No Independence Before Majority Rule) became the nationalist's plumb line, forcing Ian Smith to accept majority rule as inevitable. The second fact to reveal itself was that Rhodesian forces could not contain the ZANLA and ZIPRA onslaught and, with this revelation, Ian Smith's bargaining position steadily weakened. He should have followed his own advice to listen to both sides of an argument. Alas despite these realisations the nationalists gained strength and resolve. In 1977, Dr David Owen, an agreement with Cynsa Vawoyi launched the Anglo-American Peace

¹ Brian Harvey email 11/9/2019, WhatsApp discussion 16/9/2019.
² Dr David Owen served as British Foreign Secretary 1975-1979, was appointed a life peer in 1992. Email 28/11/2019.
³ Harvey, K, Acoffe, Elin, H, & Anderson, D. (2022), pp. 115, 118, 119, and 201; Robin Harvey and interview 28-27/2/2020.
⁴ These included the Pearce Commission (1972), SA Deveson Hastings (1978), Geneva Conference (1978) and Mike Talla (1978).
⁵ Smith, I. (1997), p. 28.